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Abstract

Using data from the 2014-2016 Major League Soccer seasons, this paper finds evidence
for nationality discrimination in the MLS. In particular, foreign players receive a wage
premium of 15.97 percent, ceteris paribus. Foreign players also receive an additional
bump in their salary based on performance. Finally, using an Oaxaca (1973)
decomposition, I find that 22-26% of the differences in wages between foreign and
domestic players is largely due to discrimination.
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I.

Introduction

Sports like basketball, football, hockey, and baseball all have a rich and lengthy
history in the United States. Soccer, however, has only more recently began to gain
traction in the American sporting world (Heitner, 2015). Global powerhouse soccer
nations such as Brazil, Argentina, Germany, and Italy have been able to grow the game of
soccer for many more years than the United States (Mayassi, 2014). These countries have
a culture founded on both domestic and international soccer success. Importantly, each of
these powerhouse soccer countries have achieved some domestic success by way of their
premier soccer leagues’ achievements.
In the United States, there is currently only one premier soccer league. That
league is Major League Soccer (MLS). The MLS is a very young league as it was only
created in 1993. As far back as its inception, the league has been labeled as a league for
aging foreign stars to finish their careers (Nguyen, 2016). It is said that the older foreign
stars are paid handsomely to play soccer while living an exceedingly comfortable
lifestyle (Davis, 2016). These players are no longer as talented as they once were on their
former teams. This unusual aspect to the league is reflected by the apparent convex wage
structure in the MLS. The MLS wage structure is different to those in Europe because
players receive larger salaries1 towards the end of their career, despite their drop in
performance from age (Kuethe and Motamed, 2009). This is due to the willingness of the
MLS to pay higher wages for aging foreign stars in hopes that these foreign stars can help

1

Salary, wages, and compensation are used interchangeably throughout the paper.
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grow the league through their star power and global popularity (Davis, 2016). No matter
how influential all foreign players have been for the growth of the league, they are often
the ones targeted by the media for much of the aforementioned reasons (Davis, 2016).
There is limited research on racial and/or nationality discrimination in soccer
largely due to the lack of available data on salaries and performance metrics. The studies
that exist generally employ a market test approach. That is, assuming that markets
operate efficiently, the wage bill of any club should match the productivity of its players
and, therefore, the performance of the team in terms of league position. They find that
there is evidence of racial discrimination against black players in English league soccer
(Szymanski, 2000) as well as in the English Premier League, German Bundesliga,
Spanish Primera Division, Italian Serie A, and French Ligue 1 (Wilson and Ying, 2003),
and some nationality discrimination against domestic players in English league soccer
(Pedace, 2007). Moreover, said discrimination appears to be driven by owner
discrimination as opposed to fan discrimination (Szymanski 1998, 2000; Wilson and
Ying, 2003).
There is, however, extensive research on racial and/or nationality discrimination
in other sports as they do not suffer from the lack of salary data and comprehensive
performance metrics. The evidence on nationality discrimination in the NBA is mixed.
Some studies find international players receive a wage premium (see for example,
Eschker, 2004), while others find they experience a wage penalty (see for example, Yang
and Lin, 2010). A shortcoming with these studies, however, is they do not allow for
differential returns to performance characteristics by nationality. The purpose of this
paper is to add to the existing literature on nationality discrimination in soccer by
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applying the methodology used in the NBA studies. To the best of my knowledge, this
has not been performed in soccer due to data constraints in European soccer leagues.
Importantly, this paper includes detailed player salary data and an advanced performance
metric for every field position. Moreover, I extend the analysis in the NBA studies by
allowing for differential returns to the variables by implementing an Oaxaca
decomposition. This decomposition allows me to determine how much of the nationality
wage differential is due to observable and unobservable characteristics.
This paper finds support for foreign players being paid a wage premium for their
services. Further, after controlling for the differences between foreign and domestic
players, foreign players receive an added “bump” in their salary for their on-the-field
performance compared to domestic players. The models account for a player’s
performance and popularity by the Man of the Match award and All-Star team selection.
Foreign players selected to the All-Star team roster receive an additional salary “bump.”
While every attacking position was statistically significant for domestic players’ salaries,
it is the foreign forwards who are paid more than their domestic counterparts. Utilizing
the Oaxaca (1973) decomposition, 22-26% of the wage differential is largely due to
discrimination.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows: Section II presents a history
of the premier soccer leagues in the United States. In Sections III and IV, I discuss the
data and empirical strategy and results, respectively. The closing section presents
conclusions and possible MLS policy implications for the future.
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II.

History

The history of soccer in the United States is very different to many top global
leagues. The first attempt to create a premier soccer league in the United States was the
creation of the National American Soccer League (NASL). This league was started in
1968 but then subsequently folded in 1984. The failure of the NASL can help us
understand the importance of growing soccer through a premier soccer league and
creating an authentic soccer culture.
The NASL was an ambitious attempt to create a soccer fandom from virtually
nothing (Abnos, 2015). It is easy to understand why it failed when you look at how the
teams were constructed and what the league was hoping to create. From the start, owners
did not often have the growth of the game and American soccer players in the front of
their minds. One of the most famous teams to come out of the NASL era was the New
York Cosmos. The New York Cosmos did an excellent job at selling out stadiums and
securing large attendance figures for their games, but this was only due to their
extravagant spending on older foreign players, notably Pele and Franz Beckenbauer
(Salter, 2015). These players were once the best the soccer world had to offer. Once the
Cosmos had signed their foreign stars, other teams felt the need to follow the Cosmos
path and sign other foreign stars like Johann Cruyff and George Best. Their business
model was not sustainable in the long-run.
Short-term growth spurred the decisions made by the owners. They were more
concerned about getting more fans at the immediate NASL games than growing the game
of soccer in America (Abnos, 2015). The San Diego Sockers President describes the
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situation that evolved in the NASL when he stated, “It became fashionable to chase the
Cosmos. Everyone had to have a Pele. Coaches went around the world on talent searches,
forcing up prices.” (Abnos, 2015) The exceedingly high payrolls coupled with high rent
for stadiums and inadequate broadcasting contracts were detrimental to the league
(Abnos, 2015). I argue that the rosters appeared to be constructed more for popularity
than for success. The ambition was there, but the forward-thinking was not.
The league faced many troubles during its time. One of areas where the league
was initially lacking was the roster composition of its member teams. It was not until the
league began to falter when the owners decided to make changes to help the league and
improve the domestic players. Although the league began the college draft in 1972 to
boost native American and Canadian players in the league, these players were never truly
showcased or given the tools to succeed ("North American Soccer League (1968–84)”,
n.d.). It was often the case that the American soccer players were left to sit on the bench.
To 1979 season, the NASL only required each team to start two US or Canadian born
players ("North American Soccer League (1968–84)”, n.d.). In 1980, to improve
domestic talent, the number of domestic players required to start was increased to three.
These increases led to an increased demand for top American talent and to the highest
transfer fee for an American player at the time with the signing of Jim McAlister for
$200,000 (Reed, 1980). The attempts to increase American and Canadian born players’
presence in professional soccer was well-intended, but the effort was not enough and
arguably came much too late. One of the larger failures by the NASL came down to their
lack of developing domestic talents (Wangerin, 2008).
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Despite the failure of the league, soccer was formally introduced to the American
public. Further, the failures of the NASL provided valuable lessons for the MLS, and
some of the current MLS teams have their roots in NASL member teams.
The formation of the MLS is another unique piece to the league. Upon the United
States being awarded the 1994 World Cup, the Fédération Internationale de Football
Association (FIFA)2 pressured them into forming a professional soccer league (Abnos,
2015). FIFA had never awarded the World Cup to a nation that did not have a
professional outdoor soccer league (Jewell, 2005). Being awarded a World Cup was a big
step for soccer in the United States as it provides global recognition for the host country
(Abnos, 2015).
During the development of the MLS, much of the discussion by the commissioner
and owners was placed on how to create a soccer league that would garner the most
attention, create a vast American fan base, and be sustainable for the long-term (Abnos,
2015). Being sustainable for the long-term was the key. This new soccer league was not
like the other premier soccer leagues across the globe in many ways. To make the league
different and more exciting, several of the owners pushed for things like bigger goals,
countdown clock, shootouts instead of draws, and even more lenient referees regarding
offside calls (Abnos, 2015). Not all the discussed changes were implemented, but from
the start, the MLS was a unique soccer league (Abnos, 2015).

2

FIFA is the governing body that controls nearly all major international competitions.
The organization FIFA decides which countries are chosen to host the World Cup. The
1994 World Cup is the only time the United States has hosted a World Cup.
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Officially founded in 1996, the MLS included ten teams: DC United, New
England Revolution, NY/NJ MetroStars, Tampa Bay Mutiny, Columbus Crew, Dallas
Burn, Kansas City Wiz, Colorado Rapids, Los Angeles Galaxy, and San Jose Clash
(Strauss, 2015). These teams tried to increase the importance of domestic players on the
team (Abnos, 2015). Like the NASL, to attract attention to the league and garner support
for the league, the MLS also began to sign older, high-profile foreign talents like Jorge
Campos, Carlos Valderrama, and Roberto Donadoni (Abnos, 2015). These additions were
an expensive effort to get fans to the newly created teams’ games.
Although the growth of the league was slow, it did end up finding success when it
began to market itself to domestic talents like DeMarcus Beasley and Landon Donovan
(“History of Major League Soccer”, n.d.). It was the domestic players who gave the MLS
the added bump it desperately needed at the time. The shift from relying on foreign talent
to looking at domestic players in 2002 was pivotal to the success of soccer in the US
(“History of Major League Soccer”, n.d.). Following the success of the United States
Men’s National Team in the 2002 World Cup, the league began to truly climb.
Despite the early troubles, the MLS has seemingly risen to new heights in recent
years. The creation of soccer-specific stadiums and the introduction of strong domestic
talent along with foreign talent like David Beckham, Cuauhtémoc Blanco, Thierry Henry,
David Villa, and Kaka have helped lift the game of soccer domestically and
internationally (Baxter, 2015). In addition, a recent study shows that the MLS has the
same number of “avid” fans from 12-to-17 years old as Major League Baseball (Marcin,
2016), often considered America’s pastime sport.
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With the MLS expansion, the league has been able to add the likes of Houston
Dynamo, New York City FC, and Montreal Impact among various other teams. MLS
expansion has brought soccer to all parts of the United States and Canada and is
constantly looking to grow. Minnesota United FC and Atlanta United FC are the newest
members for the 2017 MLS season (Couch, 2016). Another two, Los Angeles FC and
Miami, are slated to join the league in 2018 and 2019 respectively (Couch, 2016).
Looking closer at the structure of the league, the MLS currently operates in a
closed-league system. There is one premier division split between a Western conference
and an Eastern Conference. Thus, there is no promotion or relegation like in most other
countries (Smith, 2016).
The MLS player salary structure is similar to the National Basketball Association
(NBA). The salary cap for the league is like the NBA in that it is not a “hard” cap. The
cap for the 2016 season was $3,660,000 (“Roster Rules and Regulations”, n.d.).
However, only the players listed 1-20 in the roster count towards the salary cap. This is
known as the Senior Roster. Teams can allocate more money to players 1-18 if they
chose not to fill slots 19 or 20 in the Senior Roster. The maximum a player on the Senior
Roster can earn is $457,500. The salaries of players 21-28 do not count towards the
salary cap. Spots 21-24 make-up the club’s Supplemental Roster and spots 25-28 make
up the Reserve Roster. The roster spots have certain requirements that must be met by the
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teams including being filled with Generation Adidas Players3, Homegrown Players4,
Designated Players5 eligible for the MLS SuperDraft, and 24-year-olds or younger
players.
Despite the league having a salary cap, teams are permitted to go over the cap by
millions of dollars. The way teams exceed the salary cap is through the Designated Player
(DP) Rule. This rule allows teams to acquire up to three players whose compensation and
acquisition costs exceed the salary cap. However, the individual club is the one
responsible for the compensation above each player’s salary amount. The teams’ DPs
have traditionally been highly paid foreign stars whose services would not be attained
under the normal MLS salary restrictions. To improve the league with foreign players
while also aiming to grow domestic talent, each club is allotted 8 international player
spots which can be traded.6
Further, the single-entity nature of the MLS allows the MLS to control all player
contracts, sponsorships, and broadcasting for the league (Jewell, 2005). When players
sign contracts to play in the MLS, they are contracted by the MLS and not the individual

3

Generation Adidas is a collaboration between the MLS and the US Soccer Federation
and is sponsored by Adidas. The goal of the joint venture is to grow the youth
professional talent in the United States. Between 6 and 13 athletes have been chosen per
year since the projects inception in 1997 (hosted by Nike until 2005). Generation Adidas
is designed to help the United States compete with foreign leagues. Players selected for
Generation Adidas have the soccer ability to play professional soccer, but they are not yet
eligible to enter the MLS SuperDraft.
4
Homegrown players are local players who were signed directly to their local MLS team.
These players do not have to go through the normal player allocation process by way of
the MLS SuperDraft
5
The Designated Player rule is discussed in the next paragraph.
6
The MLS roster regulations can be found at
http://pressbox.mlssoccer.com/content/roster-rules-and-regulations.
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team they play for (except for the aforementioned DP exception). The clubs do negotiate
the player’s salary, however, to create a salary distribution that fits the specific clubs’
needs. With the players being paid by the MLS, the MLS also controls the movement of
players. This single-entity structure, unique to the MLS, allows the MLS to control player
salaries, maintain equal quality levels amongst the entire league, and limit the largemarket versus small-market problems that hinder other American sports leagues (Young,
2016). The MLS structure is designed to bring long-term prosperity to the league and
soccer in the United States (Jewell, 2005).
The MLS is at an interesting point in its life given the rapid expansion that is
taking place. Changes will likely be made to accommodate the growth of the league and
the changing landscape of the league. There may be pressures from at home and abroad
to adopt a promotion and relegation system to enhance competition amongst the clubs
(Smith, 2016). Whether the MLS changes its structure or rules in the future, hopefully it
will continue to grow in the United States and abroad. This paper provides direction for
changes to MLS regulations in the future. Specifically, a reevaluation of the salary
dispersion will be necessary by the league. Salaries for all MLS players should emanate
from their marginal productivity. Then, the MLS will not only be able to continue to
attract the top foreign talent, but importantly, the MLS could retain its top domestic stars.
Another key component could be the regaining of domestic players who took their talents
overseas. Such change could be pivotal for the growth of the MLS and ultimately the
growth of soccer in the United States.
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III.

Data

I use data from three main sources: The Major League Soccer Players Union
(MLSPU) player compensation site7, MLS statistics site8, and Whosocored.com. The site
Whoscored.com is widely used in the soccer media (“By WhoScored.com”, n.d.) and has
become the forefront website for global soccer specific statistics. The site has only
recently provided player metrics data for the MLS. The player salary figures come
directly from the MLSPU. The MLSPU, unlike other soccer leagues around the world,
makes all the MLS players’ salaries available to the public. The non-salary variables are
taken from the remaining two data sources. This data is ideal for my purposes as it
includes detailed information on player salaries and performance metrics, as well as
certain demographic characteristics.
To be included in the data set, a player needed to have played a minimum of one
minute in the respective season. This restriction led to 242 players being excluded from
the analysis because they did not have any performance metrics. Additionally, the model
looks exclusively at the 10 outfield players (goalkeepers have been excluded as they were
not included on the MLS’s roster site containing the individual player characteristics).
The goalkeeper position is quite unique compared to the other 10 positions by the number
of them on a roster, the fact that only one tends to play each game (or each season) per
team, the different metrics used for their performance, and the differing salaries for
goalkeepers compared to the field positions.

7
8

The MLS salary data can be found at https://www.mlsplayers.org/salary_info.html.
The MLS statistics can be found at https://www.mlssoccer.com/stats/season.
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Regarding the seasons measured, there were 20 teams in 2015 and 2016 seasons,
there were only 18 teams in the league in the 2014 season. This is because the Chivas
USA folded before the 2014 season and both Orlando City FC and New York City FC
began playing in the MLS starting in the 2015 regular season. The final data set consists
of 1,397 observations for the 2014-2016 MLS seasons.
Salary is defined as each player’s guaranteed compensation for the calendar year.
Each player’s salary was taken either at the start of the season (if they were already on
the roster) or around the midway point of the season (if they transferred into the club over
the summer transfer window). I convert salary into the natural log of salary to consider
salary outliers (often the DPs). Table 1 reveals that the average salary in the MLS over
the sample period is $317,784.809. During the three-season period, the minimum salary
was $36,50010 while the maximum salary was $7,160,34011. The minimum salary and the
salary cap for each team increased over each of the three years ("MLS Players Union
announces that it has ratified collective bargaining agreement”, n.d.).12
Given the salary restrictions in the MLS, very few players can the attain million
dollar salaries. Only 65 players13 for the three seasons recorded salaries of over 1 million

9

All summary statistics salaries are adjusted according to the CPI average for the
respective year. The regression is not adjusted by the CPI because it already accounts for
time fixed effects.
10
This was the MLS minimum salary for the 2014 season.
11
This salary was earned by the DP Ricardo dos Santos Leite (Kaka).
12
The salary cap for the 2014, 2015, and 2016 season were $3.1 million, $3.49 million,
and $3.66 million, respectively. The reserve minimum also increased each of the three
years from $36,500 to $50,000 to $51,500. Also, all the salary restrictions and limitations
come from the MLS collective bargaining agreement (CBA) from 2010 to 2014 and the
CBA from 2015-2020.
13
Many of the players receiving the higher salaries received them in more than one year.
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dollars. Especially due to the roster spots reserved for younger players and the limited
salary caps for each team, just over half of the players had salaries of $150,000 or below.
It is therefore the salaries of the DPs that helps bring the MLS average salary up
tremendously.
To separate players by nationality, I create an indicator variable for foreign status
that equals 1 if the player is foreign born and equals zero if the player is domestic (born
in either the United States or Canada). Due to the MLS having teams located in both the
United States and Canada, I have considered both countries to represent the domestic
group. The players in the MLS are roughly 48 percent foreign. Moreover, foreign players
appear to earn more their domestic born counterparts. Specifically, foreign born players
on average earn $414,915.20 while domestic born players earn $227,463.10 (see Table
1).
The most unique variable included in the models that has not previously been
used in other soccer studies is the continuous player rating variable. This variable
represents the average of each individual player’s rating for their entire season. As
previously mentioned, these rating are among the best for soccer in the world and are
used widely by media outlets, bookmakers, and individual soccer clubs. These ratings are
formulated by using a comprehensive statistical algorithm that is calculated live during
each game of the season ("WhoScored Ratings Explained", n.d.). The algorithm
considers over 200 raw statistics that effect a player’s performance. Each raw statistic is
weighted according to its influence on the game. Each event on the field that a player
takes part in can have a positive or negative effect on the overall rating for the player. An
example is as follows: a failed/missed pass would have a negative effect on the players
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overall rating while a successful/completed pass would have a positive effect on a players
overall rating. The scoring system ranges from 0 to 10 and is as follows: 9.0-10=
Excellent, 8.0-8.9= Very Good, 7.0-7.9= Good, 6.0-6.9= Average, 5.0-5.9= Poor, 4.04.9= Very Poor, and 0-3.9= Extremely poor.
Per game, about 85% of players have a rating between poor and good. Few
players receive above an 8 or below a 5. However, the ratings in this paper are not based
on individual games but rather the ratings represent a player’s average rating for the
entire year. This cumulative measure allows for the best representation of a player’s
performance throughout the entire season. The player rating variable considers every
minute the player played in the season. Looking at the ratings for the entire season, fewer
players averaged above a 7 or below a 6 rating. Above a 7 rating for the season is only
earned by the top players in the season.
I include the following indicator variables for position: defenders, defendermidfielder, midfielder, forward-midfielder, and forward. The two multi-position variables
account for the players who play various positions throughout a game or season. As seen
in Table 1, foreign players make up more of the attacking positions while domestic
players make up more of the defenders. The two multi-position variables together
constitute 8.5 percent of all positions. Those variable help account for the more versatile
players who can play multiple positions.
I have created three different age buckets with age ranges of 16-23,24-31, and 3238. The different age buckets help control for differences in returns for younger, middleaged, and older aged players. Looking at the differences in age between foreign and
domestic players in Table 1, young players make-up 29% of all domestic players and
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make-up only 20% of all foreign players. Also, there are 10% more foreign players than
domestic players in the oldest age bucket in their respective group (see Table 1). The
main reason for this dramatic difference is the roster requirement that requires domestic
players to fill the latter places on a MLS team’s roster.
A variable that takes on-the-field performance into account is the Man of the
Match variable. This variable represents the number of times a player won the Man of the
Match award for a game. The Man of the Match award is given to one player every game
who is decided to have been the best or most important player in that game. Better
players tend to receive more Man of the Match awards. The only limit to the number of
Man of the Matches a player can receive is the number of games they appear in. On
average, foreign players receive more Man of the Matches than domestic players (see
Table 1).
At the half-way point of the season, a roster of around 22 players is selected by
MLS coaches, the MLS commissioner, and the fans to represent the MLS team in an AllStar game. The players selected for the All-Star game are assigned the dummy variable
All-Star Team. Players who were on the All-Star roster or were selected to be on the
roster but could not play due to injury or other circumstance are seen as being selected for
the All-Star team. The All-Star roster representation between the foreign and domestic
players is split roughly 50/50 (see Table 1). The MLS All-Star game is only once a year
and has included opponents such as Chelsea FC, Arsenal FC, Tottenham FC, and Bayern
Munich.
MLS All-Star players are the league’s best and most popular players. Given their
popularity, due to soccer skill and off-the-field prominence, these players are often the
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higher-salaried individuals who are assigned the DP role on their respective team. The
dummy variable DP accounts for each of the DPs in the league. Teams must allocate the
DP roles wisely due to their only being three spots available per team. Foreign players
make up roughly 3/4ths of all DPs (see Table 1).
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IV.

Empirical Strategy & Results

To formally determine whether there is nationality discrimination in the MLS, I
estimate a model of the following form:

LnSpty = α + θFORpty + βPERpty + δDEMpty + λt + ηy + εpty

(1)

where LnS is a measure of the natural log of salary, FOR is an indicator variable equal to
1 if the player is foreign born and equal to 0 if the player is domestic (born in the US or
Canada), PER is a vector for performance characteristics (player rating, All-Star team
selection, Man of the Match, Designated Player, minutes), DEM is a vector of
demographic characteristics (ages 16-23, ages 24-31, ages 32-38, forward, forwardmidfielder, midfielder, midfielder-defender, defender) , λ accounts for team fixed effects,
η accounts for year fixed effects, p denotes player, t denotes team, y denotes year, and ε is
an error term with the usual properties. Applying the natural log to the salary variable
allows the model to control for salary outliers.
If θ is positive (negative) then it indicates foreign born players earn (face) a wage
premium (penalty) relative to their domestic counterparts. Szymanski (2000) refers to θ
as a “taste for discrimination” coefficient. Column 1 of Table 2 presents the results for
equation (1). Foreign born players earn 15.97 percent more than domestic players. The
premium MLS teams pay for foreign players is like the overcompensation of South
Americans in England’s premier soccer league (Pedace, 2007). For the South American
players in the English Premier League, teams are willing to overpay these players due to
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their positive effects on attendance and off-the-field notoriety. This is may also be the
case in the MLS. Teams are willing to pay players for more than just their on-the-field
productivity.
The previous MLS soccer study (Kuethe and Motamed, 2010) focused heavily on
the returns to age for MLS players. In this study, the effect of age on the returns to the
three distinct age groups are each statistically different at the 1% level. The two age
buckets of 24-31 and 32-38 make 0.407 and 0.815 more in log salary than players in the
16-23 age group, respectively (see Table 2). These results demonstrate how the returns to
age are not linear. A similar finding is presented in (Kuethe and Motamed, 2009). In their
study, age has a convex relationship with salary. This convex relationship is quite unique
from any other premier soccer league around the world. Older players are rewarded more
than younger players. The younger players who are not able to perform are likely weeded
out of premier soccer leagues at a younger age. The oldest age group contains more of the
top players who could last at the top levels of soccer.
Along with older players receiving a higher salary as they get older on average,
players who play in the attacking positions14 are receive higher wages on average. The
attacking players have a perception of being more valuable to their team and their effect
on a game is much more pronounceable than that of a defensive-positioned player. Also,
players selected to the All-Star game and DPs receive higher salaries on average. These
players are rewarded for the performance and popularity. Further, the best performing

14

The attacking position are traditionally any position that is not a defender or
goalkeeper.
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players tend to play more minutes throughout the season. Their additional impact on the
team results in a higher salary on average.
The implications from the variables fall in line with the traditional labor
economics wage narrative. As an individual’s marginal productivity increases (their
performance and benefit to the team), their compensation increases. It was surprising to
see that, of all the variables, the Man of the Match variable was not significant at any of
the three major levels. I hypothesize that due to the difficulty of receiving the award,
players with more Man of the Match awards would be compensated for their
contributions to the team since only the best players in each game receive the award.15
The coefficient is positive, but it only has a minimal impact on a player’s salary.

The model presented in equation (1), however, assumes that the returns to
performance metrics and demographic characteristics do not differ by foreign status. To
take this into account, I re-estimate equation (1) separately for foreign and domestic
players and test if the returns are significantly different by foreign status. These results
are presented in Columns 2 and 3 of Table 2 for foreign and domestic players,
respectively. While previous studies have addressed what effects a soccer player’s
salaries, they did not consider the differences in returns. There are several noteworthy
results when looking at the differences in returns for the two groups of players in the
MLS.

15

It is worth noting that attacking players tend to receive more Man of the Match awards
due to their more noticeable impact on a game and their flashiness.
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First, foreign players receive an additional salary “bump” for their performance.
While domestic players receive a 46.9% increase in their salary for a 1-unit increase in
their player rating, foreign players receive a 124.3% increase in their salary, ceteris
paribus. The two groups are rewarded very differently for their respective performance
levels.
The additional “bump” in foreign players’ salaries are not ideal for domestic
players. Presumably, performance is the most crucial factor for soccer teams signing
players. But if foreign players are compensated more for a similar performance to
domestic players, the pay discrepancy may act as a disincentive for keeping the top
performing domestic players. Those players could take their talent elsewhere and be
better rewarded for their soccer performance.
Since foreign players are more experience for their performance level, MLS teams
could ideally sign more domestic players at a lower cost. Teams would be successful by
avoiding the foreign player premium. If enough teams did this, the market would
equilibrate and domestic players would then be compensated more like foreign players
based off performance (Szymanski 2000).
All-Star players also appear to earn a salary premium for being foreign. Foreign
players earn a 135.7% salary premium for being selected to the team while domestic
players only earn a 41.2% salary premium (see Table 2). This finding helps understand
that on-the-field performance is not the only important characteristic in determining a
player’s salary in the MLS. While a player needs to have played well throughout the
season to be selected to the team, their popularity is also essential for selection to the
roster. Players who are popular off-the-field or can help raise the global reputation of the
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league are compensated for their influence. It is understandable why the MLS would take
this stance given its youthfulness as a league, but one would hope that deserving
domestic players are not overlooked to accommodate for the more popular players,
despite their lacking performance.
Both nationality groups receive an immense wage premium for being DPs, but it
the domestic DPs who receive a higher premium. Looking at Table 2, one can see that
foreign players receive a 198% premium for being a DP compared to domestic players
who receive a 468% premium, ceteris paribus. For both groups, the DP status results in
an incredible boost in a player’s salary. But on average, foreign DPs still earn less than
domestic DPs. This foreign DP versus domestic DP gap likely comes down to the number
of observations for the two nationality groups. In the three years being sampled, there are
no more than 50 DPs in one season. Of all the DPs, three-quarters of them are foreign.
The few domestic DPs are likely driving the large domestic DP wage increase. Also, as
addressed previously, the salary for all MLS individuals is increasing16. Thus, while DPs
still earn incredible wages when compared to non-DPs, the wages of all players are
rising.
Still, the enormous wages of DPs compared to non-DPs is like the findings in
Kuethe and Motamed (2009). Only a few select players receive the DP designation17 and
the subsequent high wages. Without a future change in the MLS salary restrictions, this

16

This notion comes from the increasing minimum salary and rising average salary in the
league over the three periods.
17
David Beckham was the first player to receive the DP designation and fundamentally
changed the salary disparity in the league. The rule was created to attract the most
recognized international soccer stars. Previous salary regulations would not allow for
such substantial player salaries.
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DP versus non-DP wage gap will likely persist.
While the position variables are all positive for domestic players, the findings for
foreign players produce a slightly different result. Only the foreign forwards earn more
than the domestic players in the same position (see Table 2). For the other positions on
the field, the domestic players earn more than the foreign players in the same position,
ceteris paribus. Still, foreign forwards are the most compensated of any nationality and
position group. Having the best strikers is incredibly valuable for the success of a team.
Teams must feel that the foreign strikers are more well-equipped to score goals than
domestic strikers. For all soccer teams, valuing the contribution of midfielders and
defenders is traditionally much more tough than valuing the contributions of forwards.

Oaxaca Decomposition

To determine what foreign players would earn if they had the characteristics of
domestic players and vice versa, an Oaxaca (1973) decomposition is employed. The
decomposition for the two weights is as follows:

Wf - Wd = (Xf – Xd) βf + Xd (βf - βd) + (αf - αd),

(2a)

or
Wf - Wd = (Xf – Xd) βd + Xf (βf - βd) + (αf - αd),

(2b)

Foreign weights are used for equation (2a) while domestic weights are used for
equation (2b). The left-hand side of the equations represent the log wage differential. On
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the right-hand side, the first and second terms in the two equations represent the total log
wage differential attributable to differences in average player characteristics and the
differences in returns for those characteristics, respectively. The intercept differences are
accounted for by the subtracting of the alphas. The results for this equation can be found
in Table 3 in the Appendix. Columns 2 and 3 in Table 3 represent the wage differential
that is attributable to differences in characteristics versus differences in returns.
The results from the decomposition are quite interesting. Using domestic weights,
roughly 78% of the differences is due to observable factors. Thus, the remaining 22%
must be due to unobservable differences. When using foreign weights, the percent of
unobservable differences rises to roughly 26%. There is very minor difference in
obervables/unobservables between the two weights. With an Oaxaca decomposition,
much of the 22-26% in unobservable differences is likely due to discrimination.
Therefore, these findings are similar to the “taste for discrimination” discussed in
Szymanski (2000). Also, these results align with the previous results from the foreign
variable in Model 1. Those findings concluded that foreign players receive a 15.97%
wage premium. Both the Oaxaca decomposition and findings in Model 1 support the idea
that domestic players are discriminated against.

27

V.

Conclusion

Few soccer leagues in the world are like the MLS. It is a young league that has a
single-entity structure, salary cap, ever-expanding number of teams, host of foreign stars,
and an increasing presence in the shifting sports landscape. This landscape is shifting
away from the traditional big four American sports (baseball, football, basketball, and
hockey), the MLS provides a unique perspective for analysis.
Since the league’s creation, there has seemed to be a heavy reliance on foreign
players. Whether due to their soccer ability or off-the-field value, many of the foreign
players have undoubtedly been vital for the growth of the MLS, both domestically and
abroad. It is unlikely the MLS would be in the position it is today without their presence.
However, especially in the past 10 years, there has been increasing debate about whether
many of the foreign players are overpaid based on their value to the league. Ever since
the DP rule was introduced for the 2007 MLS season, the MLS has attracted some of the
world’s greatest foreign soccer players. These players, though, have often come into the
MLS at the tail ends of their careers. Despite this, they are seemingly being paid by the
league not for their ability, but for their celebrity status (see for example, Kuethe and
Motamed, 2009).
This study investigates whether, after controlling for performance metrics and
player characteristics, foreign players are being overcompensated. In other words, are
domestic players (from the United States and Canada) being discriminated against? This
paper adds on to previous discrimination research in soccer (see for example, Szymanski,
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2000 & Pedace, 2007) and MLS research (see for example, Kuethe and Motamed, 2010)
by taking the analytical approach of NBA studies (see for example, Yang and Lin, 2010).
The results of this study support the hypothesis that foreign players in the league
are overcompensated for their performance. Foreign nationality groups on soccer teams
have been demonstrated to be overcompensated (Pedace, 2007). In this study, foreign
players receive a 15.97% wage premium compared to domestic players. When looking at
the wage differential between the two groups, between 22-26% is largely due to
discrimination. Both findings support what Szymanski (2000) calls a “taste for
discrimination.” Then, looking at the different returns to performance for the two groups,
domestic players receive a 46.9% salary increase for a one-unit increase in their player
rating. However, foreign players receive a total salary increase of 124.3% for a one-unit
increase in their player rating (see Table 2). This result is similar to the discrimination
findings in Szymanski (2000) where black players were underpaid for their performance.
Both studies demonstrate inequalities in soccer leagues both domestically and abroad.
Wage determination is undoubtedly a difficult topic in sports. Owners and league
must weigh the performance of players with the profitability of the team. Finding the
right balance of players to have a successful team on-and-off the field can be a
challenging task. The MLS will need to change as it continues to grow in popularity and
talent level. This paper emphasizes the disproportionate salary dispersion in the MLS
between foreign and domestic players. A good start to keep the best domestic talent in the
United States and retrieve the domestic talents who took their talents abroad would be to
compensate them accordingly. If the top American players and top foreign talents are
playing in the MLS, the MLS could grow at an even faster rate than it currently is.
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Another implication from this study could simply come down to in the MLS, although
performance (productivity) is important, there are many other key factors that come into
play when determining a player’s salary. Soccer players, like other athletes, are
compensated for more than just their on-the-field performance.
Future studies could build on this study by including more years’ worth of data
and more metrics accounting for the popularity of players. This could further the
accuracy of the study and hopefully produce even clearer results. Additionally, soccer
economics studies could begin using the player rating metric used in this study to better
account for on-the-field productivity. While player performance has been easy to
examine in sports like basketball and baseball, accounting for performance in soccer has
traditionally been much more difficult. The use of player ratings could fundamentally
change soccer economics research in the future.
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Appendix
Table 1: Descriptive Statistics by Foreign Status
Variable
Salary

Total
Foreign
Domestic
317784.800
414951.200
227463.100
(807888.900) (948314.30) (638286.800)
Natural Log of
11.926
12.168
11.701
Salary
(0.973)
(1.041)
(0.846)
Foreign
0.482
n/a
n/a
(0.500)
Player Rating
6.682
6.724
6.643
(0.361)
(0.357)
(0.361)
Designated Player
0.091
0.144
0.041
(0.288)
(0.351)
(0.199)
All-Star Team
0.054
0.051
0.058
(0.227)
(0.219)
(0.234)
Man of the Match
0.687
0.825
0.559
(1.325)
(1.530)
(1.087)
Ages 16-23
0.246
0.199
0.290
(0.431)
(0.400)
(0.454)
Ages 24-31
0.583
0.577
0.588
(0.493)
(0.494)
(0.492)
Ages 32-38
0.171
0.224
0.122
(0.377)
(0.417)
(0.327)
Minutes
1253.191
1293.669
1215.565
(884.884)
(835.822)
(927.160)
Forward
0.200
0.226
0.177
(0.400)
(0.418)
(0.382)
Forward-Midfield
0.057
0.058
0.057
(0.232)
(0.234)
(0.231)
Midfield
0.384
0.421
0.349
(0.486)
(0.494)
(0.477)
Defender-Midfield
0.028
0.018
0.037
(0.165)
(0.132)
(0.190)
Defend
0.331
0.278
0.380
(0.471)
(0.448)
(0.486)
2014
0.315
0.285
0.343
(0.465)
(0.452)
(0.475)
2015
0.343
0.342
0.344
(0.475)
(0.475)
(0.475)
2016
0.342
0.373
0.314
(0.475)
(0.484)
(0.464)
Note: N=1,397 for all, N= 673 for foreign, N= 724 for domestic.
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Table 2: Salary Regression Results by Foreign Status
Total
Foreign

Foreign

Domestic

0.148***
n/a
n/a
(0.035)
Player
0.613*** 0.808*** 0.385***
rating
(0.075)
(0.094)
(0.118)
Ages 24-31 0.407*** 0.617*** 0.253***
(0.042)
(0.047)
(0.071)
Ages 32-38 0.815*** 0.923*** 0.715***
(0.056)
(0.072)
(0.084)
Designated 1.246*** 1.092*** 1.736***
Player
(0.067)
(0.118)
(0.084)
Minutes
0.000***
0.000
0.000***
(0.000)
(0.000)
(0.000)
Forward
0.417*** 0.538*** 0.286***
(0.055)
(0.065)
(0.086)
Midfield
0.257***
0.349***
0.133*
(0.042)
(0.051)
(0.068)
Forward0.163**
-0.125
0.409***
midfielder
(0.079)
(0.124)
(0.094)
Defender0.097
-0.252
0.270**
midfielder
(0.106)
(0.204)
(0.110)
All-Star
0.626*** 0.857*** 0.345***
Team
(0.084)
(0.098)
(0.137)
Man of the
0.025
-0.020
0.049**
Match
(0.017)
(0.024)
(0.024)
2015
0.140*** 0.181*** 0.127***
(0.042)
(0.049)
(0.067)
2016
0.282*** 0.390*** 0.197***
(0.042)
(0.051)
(0.066)
Note: N= 1,397 for all, N= 673 for foreign, N= 724 for domestic. Robust standard errors
are in parentheses. Salary is measured in natural logs
*, **, *** denote significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively.
Foreign variables that are statistically significant from the domestic variables are bolded.
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Table 3: Oaxaca Decomposition Results
Foreign Domestic
Weights Weights
Total Log Wage Differential

0.467

0.467

Attributable to Differences in
0.347
0.364
Characteristics
Attributable to Differences in
0.120
0.103
Coefficients
Note: N= 1,397 for all, N= 673 for foreign, N= 724 for domestic.

